sponsible for it. In this paper, we propose an application-independent Approaches in the second category rely on application framework for identifying compromised sensor nodes.
tify compromised nodes so that they can be excludedfrom a where the false information is introduced and who is resensor network once andfor all.
sponsible for it. In this paper, we propose an application-independent Approaches in the second category rely on application framework for identifying compromised sensor nodes.
specific detection mechanisms which enable sensor nodes The framework provides an appropriate abstraction of to monitor the activities of others nearby. Once observing application-specific detection mechanisms, and models the an abnormal activity, a node may raise an alert either to the unique properties ofsensor networks. Based on theframebase station or to other nodes, who further determine which work, we develop alert reasoning algorithms to identify nodes are compromised. We call approaches in this catecompromised nodes. The algorithm assumes that comprogory alert-based. Typical alert-based approaches include mised nodes may collude at will. We show that our algothose in sensor network routing [9] and localization [13] . rithm is optimal in the sense that it identifies the largest Such alerts make it possible to pinpoint compromised number of compromised nodes without introducing false nodes. But how to effectively utilize such information is positives. We evaluate the effectiveness ofthe designed alchallenging. It is hard to decide whether to trust an alert gorithm through comprehensive experiments, since compromised nodes may as well raise false alerts to mislead the base station. Compromised nodes may further form a local majority and collude to increase their influ- 1 Introduction ences in the network. Moreover, existing alert-based approaches are application specific. They cannot be easily exCompared with traditional wired and wireless networks, tended to other domains. A general solution to the accurate low-power wireless sensor networks can be rapidly de- identfication of compromised nodes still remains elusive.
ployed in a large geographical area in a self-configured
The problem of identifying compromised nodes shares manner. This makes them very suitable for real-time, largecertain similarity with fault diagnosis in diagnosable sysscale information collection and event monitoring in hostems [15] . However, in those systems, faults are assumed tile environments. Such applications, meanwhile, impose to be permanent, which means a faulty node will always unique security challenges. In particular, since sensors are fail a test, and thus can always be identified by fault-free often deployed in open environments, they are vulnerable to nodes. Some later works relax permanent faults to interphysical attacks. Once recovering the keying materials of mittent faults [3] , which however still assume that a faulty some nodes, an adversary is able to impersonate them comnode cannot pass a test following certain probabilities. This assumption does not hold in sensor networks, where a comidentifying compromised nodes. The central compopromised node may behave arbitrarily. For example, it may nent of the framework is an abstraction of the monialways report correct sensing data, and meanwhile issue toring relationship between sensor nodes. Such relafalse alerts. Such malicious behavior cannot be observed by tionship can be derived from application specific dean uncompromised node. Thus, we cannot directly apply tection mechanisms. The framework further models works in self-diagnosable systems to identify compromised sensor nodes' sensing and monitoring capabilities, and nodes in sensor networks.
their impacts on detection accuracy. This framework The problem of false alerts (or feedback) and collusion is built on detection mechanisms provided by applialso arises in decentralized systems such as online auction cations. It does not require sensor nodes to support communities and P2P systems [10, 17] availability of such channels [2, 5] .
A compromised beacon node may claim its own location Finally, we assume the base station is trusted, and arbitrarily, making non-beacon nodes around derive their lohas sufficient computation and communication capabilities. cations incorrectly. Liu et al. [13] proposed a mechanism Hence, we adopt a centralized approach, where the base stato detect malicious beacon nodes. The basic idea is to let tion is responsible for reasoning about alerts and identifying beacon nodes probe each other and check the sanity of the compromised nodes. The responsibility of each node is only claimed locations. If a beacon b1 detects b2 providing bogus to observe abnormal behavior and raise alerts to the base location information, it will send alerts to the base station. station as required by application specific detection mechaClearly, a compromised beacon node may also send false nisms.
alerts to the base station.
After receiving a set of alerts from beacon nodes, what 2.3 The Framework information is needed for the base station to make a rational decision on compromised nodes? First, the base station With the above assumptions, our framework for identifyneed the monitoring relationship to know whether an alert is ing compromised nodes is composed of the following comvalid, i.e., whether beacon nodes b1 and b2 are close enough ponents:
to probe each other. Second, due to the imprecision of disObservability graph. An observability graph is a ditance measuring, an uncompromisedbeacon node may raise rected graph G(V, E), where V is a set of vertices that alerts against another uncompromised one. The base station represent sensor nodes, and £ is a set of edges. An edge has to take this possibility into consideration. Third, it is (s, 82 s) c F if and only ifs1 is an observer of s2. An obnecessary to regularly probe a beacon node so that it can be servability graph is derived from the detection mechanism of an application. Note that V only contains those nodes phasize that our framework is built on the alert-based detecwhose security is concerned by a detection mechanism. For tion mechanisms provided by applications. The framework example, in sensor network localization, the observability itself does not require sensor nodes to support additional graph only includes beacon nodes. Figure 1 (b) shows the functionalities, and thus does not introduce additional comobservability graph corresponding to the sensor network lomunication and computation costs to the network. calization deployment in figure 1(a).
Alerts. An alert takes the form (t, s1, 82), indicating During the operation of the sensor network, the base staObserver model. Similarly, an observer model repretion compares the number of alerts actually raised by S 1 sents the effectiveness of the detection mechanism of a senagainst S2 with the expected number. Only when the former sor network, which is captured by its observability rate rb, is higher than the latter with statistical significance, should positive accuracy rp and negative accuracy rn. rb is the the base station consider it as abnormal. Specifically, for evprobability that an observer s I observes an activity when it ery event sensed by sj, the probability that si raises an alert is conducted by an observee 82. This reflects the fact that against sj is given by C = rb -((rm -(1 -rn) + (1 -rm) -rp).
in some applications, due to cost and energy concerns, 8 I Let fj (x) be the distribution of the number of events that may not observe every activity of s2. The positive accuracy can be sensed by sj. Then the distribution of the number of rp is the probability that sI raises an alert when 82 conducts alerts along the edge (si, sj) (i.e., those raised by si against an abnormal activity observed by s 1. Similarly, rn is the sj) is fij (x) = fj ( ). For a period t, the expected number probability that s, does not raise an alert when 82 conducts o a a normal activity observed by s1. rp and r>, reflect the in-of alerts along (stim j) wpll be Rij (t) = C lrs fij (a) trisiccaabiit of a deeto mehns.
During a time period T, if the number of alerts along the trinsiccapability of a detection mechanism. edge (si, sj) is over Rij (T) + 6, where d > 0 is an apSecurity estimation. If it iS possible that all the nodes in plication specific parameter, then we say the edge (si, sj) the network are compromised, then the base station cannot is an abnormal edge in the observability graph. Otherwise, identify definitely which nodes are compromised based on (si, sj) is normal. An abnormal edge can be interpreted as alerts. Therefore, this framework focuses on the situation a definite claim from si that sj is compromised. Similarly, where the number of compromised nodes does not exceed a normal edge represents si's endorsement that sj is not a certain threshold K. We call K the security estimation compromised. Note that it is possible that sj is not comof a network. How to determine K is application specific, promised but malfunctioned. But in this case, we treat s j as depending on, e.g., the assumption of attackers' capability, compromised anyway since information or services from sj the strength of sensors' keys, and how long the network has cannot be trusted anymore. been deployed.
Given an abnormal edge (si, sj), either si is comproIdentification function. An identification function F mised and raises many bogus alerts against sj, or sj is comdetermines which nodes are compromised. Formally, it promised and its malicious activities are observed by s i, or takes as inputs the observability graph G, the sensor reliboth. If we further suppose there is an additional normal ability rm, the observer model (rb, rp, rn), the security esedge (si, sj), then one of si and s, must be compromised.
timation K, and a set of alerts raised during a period T, and
Otherwise, the two edges should be consistent with each returns a set of node IDs, which indicate those nodes that other since sl and si observe the activities ofthe same node are considered compromised. 8j during the same period of time.
The above framework is application independent. It can be used to model a large range of sensor networks. We emDefinition 3.1 Given an observability graph G(V, E), let In the first phase, we compute or approximate the compromised core, identifying those nodes that are definitely comDefinition 3.2 Given an inferred graph 1(V), EC) and a sepromised. In the second phase, we tradeoff accuracy for curity estimation K, a valid assignment with regard to I eliminating more compromised nodes. Return Sb ifs1 issues a lot ofalerts against 82, we cannot conclude that one of them is compromised and the other is not. It is possi- Figure 3 . An Efficient algorithm to approximate the comble that both of them are compromised and the attacker just promised core wants to confuse the identification function.
On the other hand, no matter how compromised nodes collude, it always holds that a suspicious pair contains at we choose the size of maximum matchings of I as such an least one compromised node. This property helps us derive approximate. We denote the size of the maximum matchthe lower bound of the number of compromised nodes.
ings of an undirected graph G as MG. We may tradeoff accuracy for eliminating more comproeach node. mised nodes. Since a suspicious pair contains at least one Thus, we seek efficient algorithms to approximate the compromised node, identifying both nodes as compromised size of minimum vertex covers. To prevent false positives, will introduce at most one false positive. By computing the we are interested in deriving a good lower bound of the maximum matching of a residual graph and treating them size of minimum vertex covers, a goal different from that as compromised, the false positive rate is bounded by 0.5. Of many existing approximation algorithms. In this paper, Note that this is the best we can do only based on a given set of alerts. In order to reduce this worst-case false pos-
We also compare our approach with EigenTrust [10] itive rate, application specific information or assumptions and PeerTrust [17] , two well-known reputation-based trust are needed.
functions for P2P systems. EigenTrust and PeerTrust both In summary, given an inferred graph and a security esderive a unique global trust value for each entity from that timation, our approach is first to approximate its comproentity's transaction records. Applied in sensor networks, the mised core. We then compute the maximum matching ofthe global trust values can be used to rank sensor nodes, where residual graph, and further eliminate compromised nodes.
those with low trust values are identified as compromised. Therefore, they can be compared with general+mm. 4 Experiments We conduct three sets of experiments to evaluate the im-4 Experiments pacts of the following factors on the effectiveness of the above approaches. We simulate a sensor network deployed to monitor the temperature of an area of lOOm x lOOm. For simplicity, we 4.1 Local Majority assume sensor nodes are randomly distributed in the area. We adopt a simple detection mechanism. If the distance Figure 4 shows the effectiveness of different approaches between two sensor nodes is within 10 meters, and the temwhen compromised nodes form local majorities. The numperatures reported by them differ by more than 1°C, the ber of nodes in the network is set to be 200. The concentrabase station infers that each of them raises an alert against tion of compromised nodes is varied from 5 to 100. When the other. In other words, two nodes are observers of each compromised nodes are extremely close to each other, they other if they are with in 10 meters.
essentially form a cluster. Suspicious pairs only involve Sensor nodes report temperatures to the base station once those compromised nodes near the edge of the cluster. per minute, and the sensed data follows a normal distribuThose near the center of the cluster do not appear in the intion N(-t, a2), where jt is the true temperature at a location, ferred graph, and thus cannot be identified. We note that and a = 0.2, which is consistent with the accuracy of typieven in this situation the general+mm approach can still cal thermistors in sensor network [1] .
achieve detection rate over 0.6, mainly due to the maximum Unless otherwise stated, we assume 10% -15% of the matching approach in the second phase. When the compronodes in the network are compromised. The security estimised nodes are less concentrated, the general identification mation K = 0.15N, where N is the total number of nodes algorithm enables the base station to quickly identify almost in the network. The goal of the attacker is to raise the temall the compromised nodes. That is why we see a quick rise perature reading in the area. The attacker may choose to in general+mm's detection rate and a sharp drop in its false either randomly compromise nodes in the field, in which positive rate.
case no local majority is formed, or compromise nodes cenWhen compared with other schemes, we have the foltered around a position (x, y), following a normal distribulowing observations. First, EigenTrust seems to be inferior tion with a standard deviation Cd. The latter corresponds to to general+mm and PeerTrust. The reason is that Eigenthe case of local majority, and the parameter Cd controls its Trust relies on the existence of pre-trusted peers to identify strength. The smaller Cd is, the closer compromised nodes malicious collectives, which correspond to colluding comare to each other, and thus the stronger the local majority is.
promised nodes in our setting. Without pre-trusted peers,
We call Crd the concentration of compromised nodes.
it cannot significantly distinguish malicious entities from The evaluation metrics of the experiments are the detecgood ones. That is why we see an upper bound of the detection rates and false positive rates of the proposed identification rate of EigenTrust even when compromised nodes do tion approach.
not form a strong local majority. We act conservatively, and assume that compromised Second, we notice that when the concentration is over nodes are in fact colluding, but the base station does not 20, PeerTrust and voting mechanism actually yield compaknow this and cannot utilize any knowledge of the collurable detection rate to that of general+mm with a little bit sion. Compromised nodes all report the same false temperlower false positive rates. A closer examination of the netature so that there are no alerts between them. We evaluate work reveals that, with 200 nodes in the network, the averthe effectiveness of the general AppCompromisedCore alage number of observers for each node is around 3. When gorithm followed by the maximum matching approach. We the concentration is 20, among the neighbors of a comprocall it general+mm in the experiment. Third, when the compromised nodes form strong local An accurate security estimation is not expected to always be majorities (i.e., the concentration is smaller than 20), genavailable. The next experiment evaluates how the accuracy eral+mm yields much higher detection rates and lower false of a security estimation affects the effectiveness of different positive rates than PeerTrust. And the simple voting has approaches. The total number of sensor nodes are set to be the poorest detection rate as low as 10%, as it does not do 200. The number of compromised nodes is 20, and their any reasoning on the credibility of the feedback. This is an concentration is set to be 15. The security estimation is varimportant advantage of our approach. In sensor networks, ied from 20 to 40. Voting mechanism is not evaluated in it is always cost-effective for attackers to compromised a this experiment as it does not involve this parameter when small portion of the network, and make them collude. Othidentifying compromised nodes. The experiment results are erwise either they have to compromise a large portion of shown in figure 6 . false positive rate, and our algorithm outperforms other 3
In the next experiment, we evaluate the impact on the algorithms when there exists a strong collusion. Thus we effectiveness of our algorithms when the security estimareport the experimental results which set the concentration tion is in fact less than the actual number of compromised of compromised nodes to be 15, a not too strong case. We nodes in a network. Same as the previous experiment, we have also tried other concentration parameters and observed set the number of compromised nodes to be 20 and vary the similar trends. Figure 5 (a) and 5(b) show respectively the security estimation K from 1 to 19. We observe that our detection rate and the false positive rate of each approach. algorithm always throws an exception, stating the size of We see that when the number of sensor nodes increases, the minimum vertex cover of the inferred graph is greater all the approaches achieve better detection rates and less than K. This exception indicates that we underestimate the false positive rates. Intuitively, the more densely sensor number of compromised nodes when setting K because it nodes are deployed, the more observers each node has, contradicts with lemma 3.1. We realize that such underestiand thus the more likely an abnormal activity is detected. mation may not always be detected. It is possible that with The second observation is that general+mm do not achieve certain observability graphs, an attacker might be able to high detection rates when sensor nodes are deployed very compromise more than K sensor nodes, and submit false loosely. This is because in this situation many nodes do not data and alerts in a way such that the size of the minimum have any observers. There are too few alerts for the base stavertex cover of the resulting inferred graph is no more than tion to identify compromised nodes definitely. The third ob-K. We will study the properties of such graphs in future servation, we see that general+mm detects much more comwork. Currently, we treat the exceptions as chances to use promised nodes with similar false positives than all other multiple K for the detection. That is, if there is an excepapproaches, due to the fact that it takes the unique propertion, then we should go back and double check our estimaties of sensor networks into consideration so that it is more tion about K, then recompute another bigger K and run our resilient to compromised nodes forming local majorities, algorithm again. Figure 6 . The impact of the accuracy of security estimation 5 Related Work ing [4] . The work of this paper is complementary to the above techniques, and can be combined to achieve high information assurance for sensor network applications. SevMuch work has been done to provide security primitives eral approaches have been proposed to detect and tolerate for wireless sensor networks, including practical key manfalse information from compromised sensor nodes [6, 16 ] agement [7, 11] , broadcast authentication [12] , and data through e.g., sampling and redundancy. But they do not proauthentication [16] as well as secure in-network process-
